Party discipline and the parliamentary process - editors' introduction by Blackbourn, Jessie & Davis, Fergal F.
Editors’ Introduction 
Dr Jessie Blackbourn
*
 and Dr Fergal Davis
†
 
In the United Kingdom (UK), backbench rebellions have become an increasingly frequent 
feature of parliamentary politics. According to Cowley, government Members of Parliament 
(MPs) voted against their party line in 35 per cent of Commons divisions from 2010 to 2015 
(Cowley, 2015). That was an increase of seven per cent from the previous parliament under 
the Labour government of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown (Cowley, 2015). Such rebellions 
are unheard of in Australia. In stark contrast to the UK, strong political party discipline and 
cohesion effectively exclude all dissent on the parliamentary floor.  
The articles in this special section explore how this system of strong party discipline and 
cohesion has affected the way in which Australian parliaments perform their oversight 
functions.  
Fergal Davis’s article examines political rights review. Davis digs down into the workings of 
that form of human rights review in Australia. He identifies features of the Australian 
political architecture – in particular the strong system of party discipline – which are 
impeding the effective operation of political rights review. Davis does identify potential for 
strengthening the system of political rights review but ultimately cautions that any such 
model must be designed with an eye to the existing political architecture. 
Strong party discipline is also evidenced in John Halligan and Richard Reid’s article, which 
examines ‘dissensus’ in the parliamentary committee system in Australia. Through analysis 
of over forty years of committee reporting, Haligan and Reid highlight the increasing trend 
towards the publication of minority, or dissenting reports by committees. This, it is argued, is 
in part due to the strong party discipline. This leads Halligan and Reid to question whether 
parliamentary committees can still fulfil their objective of scrutinising parliament in the 
absence of consensus in the parliamentary committee system. 
Adele Lausberg’s article examines one of the areas in which strong party discipline has given 
way to collaboration between members of different parties. Lausberg argues that cross-party 
collaboration has, for the most part, been used by women politicians to advance socio-moral 
issues which might attract a conscience vote, such as those relating to euthanasia and 
abortion. Whilst this has only happened on rare occasions to date, Lausberg argues that an 
increase in the number of women (and feminists) in parliament will enable cross-party 
collaboration to achieve results. 
Whilst cross-party collaboration may allow individual politicians to break party ranks in 
order to engage in bipartisan behaviour, bipartisanship itself does not necessarily benefit the 
parliamentary process. This is demonstrated in Gabrielle Appleby’s article, which reveals the 
darker side of bipartisanship. Through analysis of what she terms the ‘egregious examples of 
abuse of delegated authority by the Government in recent years’, Appleby concludes that 
bipartisan support for delegated legislation has diminished parliament’s role in scrutinising 
the executive. For Appleby, this creates the need for courts to take an unorthodox position 
and intervene where typically they would not have interfered in the relationship between the 
executive and the legislature. 
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The four articles in this special section show that there is more to the question of political 
party discipline in Australia than initially meets the eye. Party discipline is unacknowledged 
in law – but its existence is impacting sharply upon the scrutiny of legislation. 
The papers in this Section were initially presented at a Workshop on Party Discipline and the 
Parliamentary Process hosted by Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law UNSW and the New 
South Wales Chapter of the Australasian Study of Parliament Group in the Parliament of 
NSW in June 2014. The editors are grateful to the workshop participants for their input.  In 
particular we wish to thank the Hon. Don Harwin MLC, President of the Legislative Council 
of NSW, Mr Bruce Notley-Smith MP and Mr David Blunt, Clerk of the Parliaments and 
Clerk of the Legislative Council for their support. 
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